Film Critique The Queen Essay Example for Free

Film Critique The Queen Essay Movie roles performed by high caliber actors and actresses of living icons are always the hardest to portray. Helen Mirren’s portrayal of HRH Queen Elizabeth II, has given us an amazing resemblance (although without as much effects and make-up the resemblance ended) and an in-depth visual and emotional recognition of the British royal who was considered to be so distant and ethereal. I am more than glad that the Reston Multiplex Movie Theatre was comparably filled with older adults than the usual teenage movie goers so I was afforded the chance to concentrate on the film. Generally, the film may not appeal to the younger audience for its lack of pound for pound action and intrigue. However it does gives us an idea of how the British monarchy behaves, as the apex of the British class system. We seldom see portrayals that are free from bias especially when the subjects are as famous and influential as the Queen and her family. But the events that catapulted them into the public eye may have relieved them of their tight bond to maintain their feelings to themselves. Diana’s death has given us glimpses into their private lives which the Queen vehemently tried to seclude her family from the curious and even blatant questions of the public and the press. We see how the Queen reacted and tried in earnest to maintain her stance and tradition to shy away from the camera and the public even as the image-conscious PM Tony Blair continued to cajole the Queen and her family out of their shells. It has also given us an insight to the life the British Royal couple has led all these years which shows support for each other and a husband who is willing to stay behind the shadow of his wife and yet live admirably together in harmony. The family’s traditional and puritan values saw the British monarch trying to distance herself away from the prying eye of the media upon news of Diana’s death. The queen’s immediate concerns were for the â€Å"boys† alone after learning of the tradgedy while vacationing at Balmoral Castle, Scotland. Apparently Diana had fallen off from the royal family to warrant the kind of behavior and almost distant hatred even after learning the news of her accidental death. Public sentiment against the monarchy grew as the Queen and family continued to be absent from the public eye even as Britain grieved for the death of their princess. Seemingly, Diana had been closer to the Britons because she showed what it was like to live a fairy tale life in the beginning and showed to the world that the monarchy was not as invincible as it seems. Profoundly Diana has created a breathing, real life princess capable of feelings thereby creating a certain link of reality to the masses and thereby showing that the monarchy was no different from anyone. Eventually as grief poured, sentiments against the monarchy grew, which PM Tony Blair handled superbly thereby surging his popularity in tune with the national mood. He became closer to the British public and the world. His continued calls for the queen and the family to at least make statements were left ignored at first with Lord Mountbatten (James Cromwell) seemingly disgruntled over PM Blair’s (Michael Sheen) insistence. The Queen explained her position to Blair that Diana lost her relation to the royal family when she divorced her son, the Prince of Wales and insisted that mourning should be a private matter handled by her own family and not by the British Crown. Later on, the Queen who was known to stick to her principle gave in after mistakenly assuming that the public sentiment will slowly ebb over time. After so much criticism from the British tabloids for failing to offer any sign of condolence, and advice from Blair on how the royals should conduct out of public respect, the Queen finally gave in despite disagreement from her mother and gave a speech praising Diana’s life and work. The British flag was also allowed to fly at half mast and a public funeral was hosted in memory of Diana. The queen was then pushed into public view as Mirren’s brilliant performance showed her exact reaction while coming out to look at the flowers in front of the curious British public who was equally assailed with mixed emotions. It was a moment that I held my breath because I had seen the actual a dozen times on television and hardly noticed any difference. The scene showed Elizabeth’s graceful human side and strength both at the same time. Her candid response to the flowers given to her showed her awe that revealed her human nature that no amount of pretense a queen could mask. In effect, the movie was critical of the monarchy but candid and transparent in its portrayal that was sometimes funny and empathic. It evoked the true nature of the royal family’s behavior and sometimes leaves us questions of their simplicity or sarcasm in public statements. Martin Sheen’s portrayal of a young and enthusiastic Tony Blair also showed a generous amount of political set-up reminiscent of the time when PM Blair suddenly gained massive popularity following Diana’s death. His behavior was indeed fitted with the contemporary mixture of grief that called for human decency and respect during Diana’s death which the royal family had mixed initial feelings of. In summary, the movie showed to the world the importance of adapting to change as opposed to the views of rigid tradition which could have led to stagnation. It also showed us that family traditions and values are being questioned in the face of common contemporary behavior and modes. Public figures are always subjected to observation and ridicule because the public always love to know how public icons behave in the face of adversities and criticize any actions for consumption. The Queen (2006) Movie. Starring Helen Mirren as the Queen Elizabeth II; James Cromwell as Lord Mountbatten and Martin Sheen as PM Tony Blair.

Sentence Structure :: essays research papers

Independent Clause (IC) An independent clause is a group of words that contains a subject and verb and expresses a complete thought. An independent clause is a sentence. Example: Jim studied in the Sweet Shop for his chemistry quiz. (IC) Dependent Clause (DC) A dependent clause is a group of words that contains a subject and verb but does not express a complete thought. A dependent clause cannot be a sentence. Often a dependent clause is marked by a dependent marker word. Example: When Jim studied in the Sweet Shop for his chemistry quiz . . . (DC) Dependent Marker Word (DM) A dependent marker word is a word added to the beginning of an independent clause that makes it into a dependent clause. Example: When Jim studied in the Sweet Shop for his chemistry quiz, it was very noisy. (DM) Some common dependent markers are: after, although, as, as if, because, before, even if, even though, if, in order to, since, though, unless, until, whatever, when, whenever, whether, and while. Connecting dependent and independent clauses There are two types of words that can be used as connectors at the beginning of an independent clause: coordinating conjunctions and independent marker words. 1. Coordinating Conjunction (CC) The seven coordinating conjunctions used as connecting words at the beginning of an independent clause are and, but, for, or, nor, so, and yet. When the second independent clause in a sentence begins with a coordinating conjunction, a comma is needed before the coordinating conjunction: Example: Jim studied in the Sweet Shop for his chemistry quiz, but it was hard to concentrate because of the noise. (CC) 2. Independent Marker Word (IM) An independent marker word is a connecting word used at the beginning of an independent clause. These words can always begin a sentence that can stand alone. When the second independent clause in a sentence has an independent marker word, a semicolon is needed before the independent marker word. Example: Jim studied in the Sweet Shop for his chemistry quiz; however, it was hard to concentrate because of the noise. (IM) Some common independent markers are: also, consequently, furthermore, however, moreover, nevertheless, and therefore. Proper Punctuation Methods This table gives some examples of ways to combine independent and dependent clauses and shows how to punctuate them properly. IC. IC.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  I went to the store. I didn't buy any bread. IC; IC.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  I went to the store; I didn't buy any bread. IC, CC IC.  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  I went to the store, but I didn't buy any bread.

Mimicking Insider Trading

Introduction Much of the field of finance Is focused on creating abnormal returns?that is to say. Returns that are different from what one might expect them to be based on various characteristics of the investment?by identifying so-called â€Å"inefficiencies† in the stock market. Perhaps one of the most well-known strategies for taking advantage of these Inefficiencies, a strategy widely discussed In academic as well as Industry literature, is following the trades of company insiders.In the united States, company insiders are required to report to the SEC any time they engage in a purchase or sale of their rim's stock. Within two business days following the date of the trade. This Information, once reported to the SEC, Is subsequently made available to the public almost immediately, allowing outsiders to see exactly how insiders are trading.When insiders trade based on material non-public information and earn abnormal returns, it is a violation of the strong form of the Effic ient Market Hypothesis, which itself is not backed by any significant emplace evidence, However, If outsiders are able to earn abnormal returns by mimicking Insider trades, this becomes a violation of the ideal-accepted semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which states that the price of a stock incorporates all publicly available information.The academic literature contains many studies which attempt to generate excess returns by replicating Insider trades, with varying degrees of success. While some early studies (Gaffe 1994, Finery 1996) claimed that outsiders were indeed able to create a small amount of excess returns, a later study by University of Michigan Professor H. Negate Shun concluded that once these trades accounted for transaction costs, the excess returns would be nearly zero. Later studies by Rezone and Zamia (1988).Line and Howe (1990) and Frederica, Gregory, Mahatma and Tones (2002) have also reaffirmed that transaction costs depleted all the excess returns from these studies. (1)On the other hand, several studies conclude that it is possible to earn excess returns by applying a â€Å"mimicking strategy' selectively. For example, Lakefronts and Lee (2001) conclude that if an investor mimics only large trades and only by the top management of a company (excluding board members, majority shareholders and other company employees), an outsider could in fact generate excess returns.Other theories suggest that It Is possible to successfully replicate Insiders trades by using the strategy in markets outside the US, such as in the Italian, German and Spanish markets. [l] A critical factor in determining whether an outsider will profit from replicating the trade of an insider is the motivation behind the trade. Insiders are likely to engage In Insider trades for a number of reasons, not all of them connected to Inside Information on future firm performance. An Inside trade that Is ambulated by liquidity or diversification needs is unli kely to contain any â€Å"predictive power and exult in any abnormal return for an outsider.While it's relatively obvious that the Insider's motivation In making an Inside trade Is a key factor in determining how successful the outsider's mimicking trades will be, existing academic literature has, for the most part, been unable to take advantage of this factor to increase returns on test portfolios. Were outsiders able to identify the motivation behind the insider's it might become possible to create a portfolio of performance-predicting trades, which would generate abnormal returns. In a 2007 paper entitled â€Å"Decoding Inside Information†, (Cohen et al.Harvard University and University of Toronto professors test an innovative and original approach to mimicking insider trades. By using a simple algorithm, the strategy attempts to separate insider traders into two categories: opportunistic traders and routine traders. Specifically, the algorithm involves analyzing the past three years of an insider's trading history, and identifying as routine traders those who had made inside trades in the same calendar month for three consecutive years. The remaining insiders, approximately, 45% of Cohen et al. ‘s sample, is identified as opportunistic traders.Insiders without three years of trading story are discarded from the sample entirely. Cohen et al. Test whether the trades made by these â€Å"opportunistic traders† contain any predictive power relating to firm performance, and how the trades of â€Å"routine traders† perform in comparison. Methodology In order to test the efficacy of this strategy, the authors construct four test portfolios at the end of month t, comprised of month it's: a) Opportunistic buys b) Opportunistic sells c) Routine buys d) Routine sells At the end of each month, the portfolios are rebalanced to reflect the routine and opportunistic inside trades and buys in that month.The objective of using these oratorios is to test whether or not there is any added value in separating routine traders from opportunistic traders, using the algorithm designed by the authors. In other words, the study tests whether following only those insiders identified by the algorithm as â€Å"opportunistic† could yield a positive alpha, and how this compares to the returns of the â€Å"routine trader† portfolios. As noted above, the SEC requires insiders to report transactions within two business days following the trade (prior to the enactment of Serbians-Solely in 2002, insiders had until the 10th day of the following month to report the trade).In the sample used by Cohen et al. , nearly all of the trades were reported on the day on which the insider made the trade. (2) As such, by the time the portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each month, information on these inside trades would have been publicly available knowledge. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the potential implications of this on the results of the strategy. Predictive Ability of Routine vs. Opportunistic Trades In order to determine whether the â€Å"opportunistic† traders, as defined by Cohen et al. s algorithm, actually contain any predictive power, the authors run pooled aggressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior month, with future one-month returns as the dependent variable. The findings reveal that both the buy and sell opportunistic trades contained much greater predictive power than routine buys and sells. The results reveal that opportunistic buys yield average returns 0. 90 basis points (with a t-statistic of 4. 46), 76 basis points higher than that of routine buys. With a p-value of 0. %, the difference is significant. It is much better indicator than considering all insider buys. Testing opportunistic versus outing sells exhibits similar results, with a coefficient of -0. 78 in the regression of opportunistic sells, and 0. 04 in the regression of routine sells. The difference is again significant with a p-value of 0% (F=29. 30). See Table 1 in Appendix for full results. Alpha The authors test for the presence of abnormal returns using several different asset pricing models, including the CAMP and the Fame-French model, as well as others.While the tests use two different types of portfolios, one value-weighted and one equally weighted, the findings are similar and the results below will therefore focus only on the equally-weighted portfolio. In the case of opportunistic versus routine buys, the results indicate monthly CAMP alphas of 1. 51% (with a t-ratio of 5. 89 and p- value The results indicate that longing opportunistic buys, and shorting opportunistic sells could yield significant excess returns. An equally-weighted portfolio of opportunistic buys and sells yields a monthly CAMP alpha of 1. 81%, and a monthly Fame-French alpha of 1. 41%, with respective t-ratios of 5. 6 and 5. 04. Based on these results, it is evident that by separating routine and opportunistic trades from trades motivated by liquidity and diversification needs, and following only the former, outsiders may be able to significantly outperform the market. Distribution of Returns While the study by Cohen et al. Goes not provide much information on the characteristics of the distribution of returns on the various portfolios used in their study, looking at other sources which study insider trading strategies may provide some insight into this issue. This information is highly relevant to risk-averse investors, to whom the probability of losses may be as important as the expected return. In Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading, H. Negate Shun finds that the probability of loss (defined as earning lower returns than an investment in the market portfolio) on a single mimicking transaction is 49. %, excluding transaction costs, and 51 . 7% when transaction costs are taken into account. (3). When combined with the study findings o n average return, which falls in the 2-3% depending on the minor variations in the study various tests of the strategy, the approximate 50-50 arability of loss indicates a positive-skewed distribution. As such an investor must mimic a large number of insider trades in order to earn returns near the average of 2-3% in Shunt's findings. While the relatively high probability of losses may seem risk averse investors, as it indicates a smaller probability of extreme negative losses.Although there are substantial differences between Cohen et al. ‘s study and Shunt's study?likely the most important of which is that Shun does not differentiate between routine and opportunistic insiders as Cohen et al. Do?the results from Shunt's study may be an indication that the distribution of Cohen et al. ‘s results are positive-skewed as well. Indeed, it is likely that following only opportunistic traders would both reduce the probability of extreme negative losses, as well as increase the probability of extreme positive gains, thereby resulting in an even further positive- skewed distribution.In addition, the high probability of loss illustrated in Shunt's findings would likely also be reduced when following only opportunistic traders. Trading Costs and Refinancing Because this strategy involves relatively active trading, its costs (commission fees and id-ask spreads) will undoubtedly be higher than those of a buy and hold strategy. That said, when the strategy is applied selectively, as is the case in the Cohen et al. Study (I. E. By mimicking only opportunistic insiders rather than all insiders) trading costs can be significantly reduced.In Cohen et al. ‘s study, the test portfolios are rebalanced at the end of every month, based on that month's opportunistic insider trades. In both the opportunistic sell and opportunistic buy portfolios, outsiders would be able to profit by shorting and buying, respectively, holding for a month, and balancing at the end of e very month. Monthly refinancing requires immediacy, and the stocks would need to be purchased and sold using market orders. The outsider would thus incur the additional costs off larger bid-ask spread.Outsiders may potentially be able to rebalanced less frequently, submitting limit orders instead of market orders, holding on to the stocks for longer periods of time, and still profit. According to Shunt's findings,(4) in the case of an â€Å"insider buy', the profits are realized over the course of several months. (5) As such, the outsider may be able to educe refinancing to twice a year, and hold on to â€Å"insider buy' stocks for 6 months. In this case, the outsider could likely afford to submit a limit buy order and wait a few days before it executes.However, this does not apply in the case of an â€Å"insider sell†, as there is no evidence to indicate that these profits are realized over a period of many months. As such, monthly refinancing it necessary. Barriers to Imp lementation In reality, while the strategy would certainly not be difficult to follow for an institutional investor or a sophisticated individual investor, it would perhaps present mom challenges for the average investor. In Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading, Shun advises that an investor mimic close to 100 insiders, in order to reduce the probability of loss to an acceptable level. 6) Granted, applying this to a strategy which differentiates between opportunistic and routine traders would likely require an outsider to follow a smaller number of insiders in order to obtain a reasonably limited probability of loss. Another potential barrier for the average investor is differentiating between routine and opportunistic traders. While Cohen et al. Ere able to accomplish this, as would institutional and sophisticated investors, it resources to successfully differentiate between the two types of insiders.While these issues may not be particularly large obstacles, they do presen t additional considerations and challenges for the individual investor. Insider Trading and Serbians-Solely An interesting point to consider is the impact of changing SEC reporting regulations on an outsider's ability to profit from following insider trades. A Stanford University study (Zealand 2005)(6) tested the success of a generic â€Å"mimicking strategy' in the ears leading up to Serbians-Solely, versus the success of the strategy in the years following the enactment of the new legislation.The study found that in the first 27 months, it was possible to generate excess returns of up to 17. 67%, including trading costs. After this period, however, it was no longer possible to obtain these returns, likely because the market had fully adjusted to this new source of public information. Looking forward, it is possible that any further changes in SEC regulation make information more readily accessible with a smaller delay, will present investors with another opportunity to earn addi tional returns before the market is able to react.Strategy Comparison While Cohen et al. Are the first to attempt to generate excess returns by differentiating specifically between routine and opportunistic traders, a number of studies in the academic literature have sought to increase returns from following insider trading by applying the strategy in various other selective ways. Although the â€Å"routine vs.. Opportunistic† strategy appears to be the most successful thus far, several other versions of the strategy have also managed to create excess returns.A duty conducted in Sweden (Ayatollah and El-Marin, 2005) reveals that replicating insider trades of stocks listed on the A-List and Attract 40 (the Swedish stock indices reserved for larger companies with significant operating history) does not generate abnormal returns at a significant level. On the other hand, replicating buy transactions of â€Å"insider clusters† (multiple firm insiders making similar trades in the same time period) of firms trading on the O-list (designated for companies which lack the requisite operating history or size for listing on the more established lists) could generate abnormal returns up to 33. , excluding transaction costs. By selectively applying a mimicking strategy to smaller companies rather than larger ones, to buy transactions rather than sell transactions, and to insider clusters (numerous firm insiders making same-type trades in a given period of time) rather to individual investors,(7) an outsider may be able to generate excess returns. The study conducted by Shun, which examines 60,000 insider transactions on the NYSE from 1975-1981, reveals similar results. Over the course of 100 days, the buy transactions exhibited excess returns of 3%, while the sell transactions underperformed the racket by 1 . %. In other words, an outsider may have been able to profit by going long â€Å"inside buys†, but not by shorting â€Å"inside sells†. He also found that there has been a greater amount of uninformative sell transactions that have taken place in the ass, compared to the ass-ass(8), it could be that since sass, the amount and frequency of stock compensations has greatly and continuously increased,(9),thus it into routines and opportunistic you would be able to keep the informative transactions and be less affect by this tendency.Shunt's results also indicate that placating insider trades in smaller firms generated higher excess returns than insider trades in larger firms. (10) It may be easier to generate excess returns by replicating insider trades in smaller firms, because these insiders are typically subjected to less scrutiny by analysts and by the media than their counterparts in larger firms. As such, they may be more willing to engage in profitable, â€Å"performance- predicting† trades than insiders at larger firms. However, it's also possible that these trades generate higher expected returns simply bec ause they have increased risk.In order to compensate investors for this risk, investments in smaller firms can be expected to generate higher returns, as reflected in the Fame French model. Similar to the Swedish study, a study conducted by Jenny et al. (1999) (7) also found replicating insider cluster transactions to be more profitable than replicating individual insider transactions. The rationale behind this?that same-type transactions from multiple firm insiders within a given period is likely motivated by insider knowledge rather than by investor-specific needs–is fairly obvious. 11) Cohen at al. Observe similar results in Decoding Inside Information. The study findings indicate that a one- standard deviation increase in the log number of opportunistic sells translates into a decrease in future returns of 29 basis points per month (excluding the specific days each year when firm executives receive stock compensation and subsequently liquidate some of their stake in the f irm). (12) By differentiating between routine and opportunistic traders as Cohen et al. O, outsiders can avoid these routine sells, and mimic only informative inside clusters. Looking Forward Although Cohen et al. And others have illustrated various ways in which outsiders ay be able to generate excess returns by mimicking insider trades, several potential obstacles may stand in the way of this strategy in the future. As with any market inefficiency, increased popularity of the strategy as well as increased accessibility to information on insider trades may cause a decline in future returns.Today, there are already a multitude of web sites that allow outsiders to track insider trades, making information about such trades readily accessible to the average investor. As a growing number of outsiders attempt to replicate these trades, it is likely that it will come increasingly difficult for investors to mimic trades in time to capture any gains. Another potential threat to this strateg y is the proliferation of endowment assurances, which firm insiders use to take advantage of offshore solutions in order to hide their transactions. Insiders are therefore able to trade stocks and derivatives of companies â€Å"anonymously', and avoid reporting insider trades to regulators. This would obviously prohibit outsiders from gaining access to and mimicking insider trades. (13) Lastly, increased penalties for insider trading could also threaten the success of the strategy. Cohen et al. How that during periods with increased cases of investors being prosecuted for insider trading, the number of trades identified as â€Å"opportunistic† decrease. In other words, insiders take seriously the risk of being caught and charged.

Mimicking Insider Trading

Introduction Much of the field of finance Is focused on creating abnormal returns?that is to say. Returns that are different from what one might expect them to be based on various characteristics of the investment?by identifying so-called â€Å"inefficiencies† in the stock market. Perhaps one of the most well-known strategies for taking advantage of these Inefficiencies, a strategy widely discussed In academic as well as Industry literature, is following the trades of company insiders.In the united States, company insiders are required to report to the SEC any time they engage in a purchase or sale of their rim's stock. Within two business days following the date of the trade. This Information, once reported to the SEC, Is subsequently made available to the public almost immediately, allowing outsiders to see exactly how insiders are trading.When insiders trade based on material non-public information and earn abnormal returns, it is a violation of the strong form of the Effic ient Market Hypothesis, which itself is not backed by any significant emplace evidence, However, If outsiders are able to earn abnormal returns by mimicking Insider trades, this becomes a violation of the ideal-accepted semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which states that the price of a stock incorporates all publicly available information.The academic literature contains many studies which attempt to generate excess returns by replicating Insider trades, with varying degrees of success. While some early studies (Gaffe 1994, Finery 1996) claimed that outsiders were indeed able to create a small amount of excess returns, a later study by University of Michigan Professor H. Negate Shun concluded that once these trades accounted for transaction costs, the excess returns would be nearly zero. Later studies by Rezone and Zamia (1988).Line and Howe (1990) and Frederica, Gregory, Mahatma and Tones (2002) have also reaffirmed that transaction costs depleted all the excess returns from these studies. (1)On the other hand, several studies conclude that it is possible to earn excess returns by applying a â€Å"mimicking strategy' selectively. For example, Lakefronts and Lee (2001) conclude that if an investor mimics only large trades and only by the top management of a company (excluding board members, majority shareholders and other company employees), an outsider could in fact generate excess returns.Other theories suggest that It Is possible to successfully replicate Insiders trades by using the strategy in markets outside the US, such as in the Italian, German and Spanish markets. [l] A critical factor in determining whether an outsider will profit from replicating the trade of an insider is the motivation behind the trade. Insiders are likely to engage In Insider trades for a number of reasons, not all of them connected to Inside Information on future firm performance. An Inside trade that Is ambulated by liquidity or diversification needs is unli kely to contain any â€Å"predictive power and exult in any abnormal return for an outsider.While it's relatively obvious that the Insider's motivation In making an Inside trade Is a key factor in determining how successful the outsider's mimicking trades will be, existing academic literature has, for the most part, been unable to take advantage of this factor to increase returns on test portfolios. Were outsiders able to identify the motivation behind the insider's it might become possible to create a portfolio of performance-predicting trades, which would generate abnormal returns. In a 2007 paper entitled â€Å"Decoding Inside Information†, (Cohen et al.Harvard University and University of Toronto professors test an innovative and original approach to mimicking insider trades. By using a simple algorithm, the strategy attempts to separate insider traders into two categories: opportunistic traders and routine traders. Specifically, the algorithm involves analyzing the past three years of an insider's trading history, and identifying as routine traders those who had made inside trades in the same calendar month for three consecutive years. The remaining insiders, approximately, 45% of Cohen et al. ‘s sample, is identified as opportunistic traders.Insiders without three years of trading story are discarded from the sample entirely. Cohen et al. Test whether the trades made by these â€Å"opportunistic traders† contain any predictive power relating to firm performance, and how the trades of â€Å"routine traders† perform in comparison. Methodology In order to test the efficacy of this strategy, the authors construct four test portfolios at the end of month t, comprised of month it's: a) Opportunistic buys b) Opportunistic sells c) Routine buys d) Routine sells At the end of each month, the portfolios are rebalanced to reflect the routine and opportunistic inside trades and buys in that month.The objective of using these oratorios is to test whether or not there is any added value in separating routine traders from opportunistic traders, using the algorithm designed by the authors. In other words, the study tests whether following only those insiders identified by the algorithm as â€Å"opportunistic† could yield a positive alpha, and how this compares to the returns of the â€Å"routine trader† portfolios. As noted above, the SEC requires insiders to report transactions within two business days following the trade (prior to the enactment of Serbians-Solely in 2002, insiders had until the 10th day of the following month to report the trade).In the sample used by Cohen et al. , nearly all of the trades were reported on the day on which the insider made the trade. (2) As such, by the time the portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each month, information on these inside trades would have been publicly available knowledge. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the potential implications of this on the results of the strategy. Predictive Ability of Routine vs. Opportunistic Trades In order to determine whether the â€Å"opportunistic† traders, as defined by Cohen et al. s algorithm, actually contain any predictive power, the authors run pooled aggressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior month, with future one-month returns as the dependent variable. The findings reveal that both the buy and sell opportunistic trades contained much greater predictive power than routine buys and sells. The results reveal that opportunistic buys yield average returns 0. 90 basis points (with a t-statistic of 4. 46), 76 basis points higher than that of routine buys. With a p-value of 0. %, the difference is significant. It is much better indicator than considering all insider buys. Testing opportunistic versus outing sells exhibits similar results, with a coefficient of -0. 78 in the regression of opportunistic sells, and 0. 04 in the regression of routine sells. The difference is again significant with a p-value of 0% (F=29. 30). See Table 1 in Appendix for full results. Alpha The authors test for the presence of abnormal returns using several different asset pricing models, including the CAMP and the Fame-French model, as well as others.While the tests use two different types of portfolios, one value-weighted and one equally weighted, the findings are similar and the results below will therefore focus only on the equally-weighted portfolio. In the case of opportunistic versus routine buys, the results indicate monthly CAMP alphas of 1. 51% (with a t-ratio of 5. 89 and p- value The results indicate that longing opportunistic buys, and shorting opportunistic sells could yield significant excess returns. An equally-weighted portfolio of opportunistic buys and sells yields a monthly CAMP alpha of 1. 81%, and a monthly Fame-French alpha of 1. 41%, with respective t-ratios of 5. 6 and 5. 04. Based on these results, it is evident that by separating routine and opportunistic trades from trades motivated by liquidity and diversification needs, and following only the former, outsiders may be able to significantly outperform the market. Distribution of Returns While the study by Cohen et al. Goes not provide much information on the characteristics of the distribution of returns on the various portfolios used in their study, looking at other sources which study insider trading strategies may provide some insight into this issue. This information is highly relevant to risk-averse investors, to whom the probability of losses may be as important as the expected return. In Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading, H. Negate Shun finds that the probability of loss (defined as earning lower returns than an investment in the market portfolio) on a single mimicking transaction is 49. %, excluding transaction costs, and 51 . 7% when transaction costs are taken into account. (3). When combined with the study findings o n average return, which falls in the 2-3% depending on the minor variations in the study various tests of the strategy, the approximate 50-50 arability of loss indicates a positive-skewed distribution. As such an investor must mimic a large number of insider trades in order to earn returns near the average of 2-3% in Shunt's findings. While the relatively high probability of losses may seem risk averse investors, as it indicates a smaller probability of extreme negative losses.Although there are substantial differences between Cohen et al. ‘s study and Shunt's study?likely the most important of which is that Shun does not differentiate between routine and opportunistic insiders as Cohen et al. Do?the results from Shunt's study may be an indication that the distribution of Cohen et al. ‘s results are positive-skewed as well. Indeed, it is likely that following only opportunistic traders would both reduce the probability of extreme negative losses, as well as increase the probability of extreme positive gains, thereby resulting in an even further positive- skewed distribution.In addition, the high probability of loss illustrated in Shunt's findings would likely also be reduced when following only opportunistic traders. Trading Costs and Refinancing Because this strategy involves relatively active trading, its costs (commission fees and id-ask spreads) will undoubtedly be higher than those of a buy and hold strategy. That said, when the strategy is applied selectively, as is the case in the Cohen et al. Study (I. E. By mimicking only opportunistic insiders rather than all insiders) trading costs can be significantly reduced.In Cohen et al. ‘s study, the test portfolios are rebalanced at the end of every month, based on that month's opportunistic insider trades. In both the opportunistic sell and opportunistic buy portfolios, outsiders would be able to profit by shorting and buying, respectively, holding for a month, and balancing at the end of e very month. Monthly refinancing requires immediacy, and the stocks would need to be purchased and sold using market orders. The outsider would thus incur the additional costs off larger bid-ask spread.Outsiders may potentially be able to rebalanced less frequently, submitting limit orders instead of market orders, holding on to the stocks for longer periods of time, and still profit. According to Shunt's findings,(4) in the case of an â€Å"insider buy', the profits are realized over the course of several months. (5) As such, the outsider may be able to educe refinancing to twice a year, and hold on to â€Å"insider buy' stocks for 6 months. In this case, the outsider could likely afford to submit a limit buy order and wait a few days before it executes.However, this does not apply in the case of an â€Å"insider sell†, as there is no evidence to indicate that these profits are realized over a period of many months. As such, monthly refinancing it necessary. Barriers to Imp lementation In reality, while the strategy would certainly not be difficult to follow for an institutional investor or a sophisticated individual investor, it would perhaps present mom challenges for the average investor. In Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading, Shun advises that an investor mimic close to 100 insiders, in order to reduce the probability of loss to an acceptable level. 6) Granted, applying this to a strategy which differentiates between opportunistic and routine traders would likely require an outsider to follow a smaller number of insiders in order to obtain a reasonably limited probability of loss. Another potential barrier for the average investor is differentiating between routine and opportunistic traders. While Cohen et al. Ere able to accomplish this, as would institutional and sophisticated investors, it resources to successfully differentiate between the two types of insiders.While these issues may not be particularly large obstacles, they do presen t additional considerations and challenges for the individual investor. Insider Trading and Serbians-Solely An interesting point to consider is the impact of changing SEC reporting regulations on an outsider's ability to profit from following insider trades. A Stanford University study (Zealand 2005)(6) tested the success of a generic â€Å"mimicking strategy' in the ears leading up to Serbians-Solely, versus the success of the strategy in the years following the enactment of the new legislation.The study found that in the first 27 months, it was possible to generate excess returns of up to 17. 67%, including trading costs. After this period, however, it was no longer possible to obtain these returns, likely because the market had fully adjusted to this new source of public information. Looking forward, it is possible that any further changes in SEC regulation make information more readily accessible with a smaller delay, will present investors with another opportunity to earn addi tional returns before the market is able to react.Strategy Comparison While Cohen et al. Are the first to attempt to generate excess returns by differentiating specifically between routine and opportunistic traders, a number of studies in the academic literature have sought to increase returns from following insider trading by applying the strategy in various other selective ways. Although the â€Å"routine vs.. Opportunistic† strategy appears to be the most successful thus far, several other versions of the strategy have also managed to create excess returns.A duty conducted in Sweden (Ayatollah and El-Marin, 2005) reveals that replicating insider trades of stocks listed on the A-List and Attract 40 (the Swedish stock indices reserved for larger companies with significant operating history) does not generate abnormal returns at a significant level. On the other hand, replicating buy transactions of â€Å"insider clusters† (multiple firm insiders making similar trades in the same time period) of firms trading on the O-list (designated for companies which lack the requisite operating history or size for listing on the more established lists) could generate abnormal returns up to 33. , excluding transaction costs. By selectively applying a mimicking strategy to smaller companies rather than larger ones, to buy transactions rather than sell transactions, and to insider clusters (numerous firm insiders making same-type trades in a given period of time) rather to individual investors,(7) an outsider may be able to generate excess returns. The study conducted by Shun, which examines 60,000 insider transactions on the NYSE from 1975-1981, reveals similar results. Over the course of 100 days, the buy transactions exhibited excess returns of 3%, while the sell transactions underperformed the racket by 1 . %. In other words, an outsider may have been able to profit by going long â€Å"inside buys†, but not by shorting â€Å"inside sells†. He also found that there has been a greater amount of uninformative sell transactions that have taken place in the ass, compared to the ass-ass(8), it could be that since sass, the amount and frequency of stock compensations has greatly and continuously increased,(9),thus it into routines and opportunistic you would be able to keep the informative transactions and be less affect by this tendency.Shunt's results also indicate that placating insider trades in smaller firms generated higher excess returns than insider trades in larger firms. (10) It may be easier to generate excess returns by replicating insider trades in smaller firms, because these insiders are typically subjected to less scrutiny by analysts and by the media than their counterparts in larger firms. As such, they may be more willing to engage in profitable, â€Å"performance- predicting† trades than insiders at larger firms. However, it's also possible that these trades generate higher expected returns simply bec ause they have increased risk.In order to compensate investors for this risk, investments in smaller firms can be expected to generate higher returns, as reflected in the Fame French model. Similar to the Swedish study, a study conducted by Jenny et al. (1999) (7) also found replicating insider cluster transactions to be more profitable than replicating individual insider transactions. The rationale behind this?that same-type transactions from multiple firm insiders within a given period is likely motivated by insider knowledge rather than by investor-specific needs–is fairly obvious. 11) Cohen at al. Observe similar results in Decoding Inside Information. The study findings indicate that a one- standard deviation increase in the log number of opportunistic sells translates into a decrease in future returns of 29 basis points per month (excluding the specific days each year when firm executives receive stock compensation and subsequently liquidate some of their stake in the f irm). (12) By differentiating between routine and opportunistic traders as Cohen et al. O, outsiders can avoid these routine sells, and mimic only informative inside clusters. Looking Forward Although Cohen et al. And others have illustrated various ways in which outsiders ay be able to generate excess returns by mimicking insider trades, several potential obstacles may stand in the way of this strategy in the future. As with any market inefficiency, increased popularity of the strategy as well as increased accessibility to information on insider trades may cause a decline in future returns.Today, there are already a multitude of web sites that allow outsiders to track insider trades, making information about such trades readily accessible to the average investor. As a growing number of outsiders attempt to replicate these trades, it is likely that it will come increasingly difficult for investors to mimic trades in time to capture any gains. Another potential threat to this strateg y is the proliferation of endowment assurances, which firm insiders use to take advantage of offshore solutions in order to hide their transactions. Insiders are therefore able to trade stocks and derivatives of companies â€Å"anonymously', and avoid reporting insider trades to regulators. This would obviously prohibit outsiders from gaining access to and mimicking insider trades. (13) Lastly, increased penalties for insider trading could also threaten the success of the strategy. Cohen et al. How that during periods with increased cases of investors being prosecuted for insider trading, the number of trades identified as â€Å"opportunistic† decrease. In other words, insiders take seriously the risk of being caught and charged.

Mimicking Insider Trading

Introduction Much of the field of finance Is focused on creating abnormal returns?that is to say. Returns that are different from what one might expect them to be based on various characteristics of the investment?by identifying so-called â€Å"inefficiencies† in the stock market. Perhaps one of the most well-known strategies for taking advantage of these Inefficiencies, a strategy widely discussed In academic as well as Industry literature, is following the trades of company insiders.In the united States, company insiders are required to report to the SEC any time they engage in a purchase or sale of their rim's stock. Within two business days following the date of the trade. This Information, once reported to the SEC, Is subsequently made available to the public almost immediately, allowing outsiders to see exactly how insiders are trading.When insiders trade based on material non-public information and earn abnormal returns, it is a violation of the strong form of the Effic ient Market Hypothesis, which itself is not backed by any significant emplace evidence, However, If outsiders are able to earn abnormal returns by mimicking Insider trades, this becomes a violation of the ideal-accepted semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which states that the price of a stock incorporates all publicly available information.The academic literature contains many studies which attempt to generate excess returns by replicating Insider trades, with varying degrees of success. While some early studies (Gaffe 1994, Finery 1996) claimed that outsiders were indeed able to create a small amount of excess returns, a later study by University of Michigan Professor H. Negate Shun concluded that once these trades accounted for transaction costs, the excess returns would be nearly zero. Later studies by Rezone and Zamia (1988).Line and Howe (1990) and Frederica, Gregory, Mahatma and Tones (2002) have also reaffirmed that transaction costs depleted all the excess returns from these studies. (1)On the other hand, several studies conclude that it is possible to earn excess returns by applying a â€Å"mimicking strategy' selectively. For example, Lakefronts and Lee (2001) conclude that if an investor mimics only large trades and only by the top management of a company (excluding board members, majority shareholders and other company employees), an outsider could in fact generate excess returns.Other theories suggest that It Is possible to successfully replicate Insiders trades by using the strategy in markets outside the US, such as in the Italian, German and Spanish markets. [l] A critical factor in determining whether an outsider will profit from replicating the trade of an insider is the motivation behind the trade. Insiders are likely to engage In Insider trades for a number of reasons, not all of them connected to Inside Information on future firm performance. An Inside trade that Is ambulated by liquidity or diversification needs is unli kely to contain any â€Å"predictive power and exult in any abnormal return for an outsider.While it's relatively obvious that the Insider's motivation In making an Inside trade Is a key factor in determining how successful the outsider's mimicking trades will be, existing academic literature has, for the most part, been unable to take advantage of this factor to increase returns on test portfolios. Were outsiders able to identify the motivation behind the insider's it might become possible to create a portfolio of performance-predicting trades, which would generate abnormal returns. In a 2007 paper entitled â€Å"Decoding Inside Information†, (Cohen et al.Harvard University and University of Toronto professors test an innovative and original approach to mimicking insider trades. By using a simple algorithm, the strategy attempts to separate insider traders into two categories: opportunistic traders and routine traders. Specifically, the algorithm involves analyzing the past three years of an insider's trading history, and identifying as routine traders those who had made inside trades in the same calendar month for three consecutive years. The remaining insiders, approximately, 45% of Cohen et al. ‘s sample, is identified as opportunistic traders.Insiders without three years of trading story are discarded from the sample entirely. Cohen et al. Test whether the trades made by these â€Å"opportunistic traders† contain any predictive power relating to firm performance, and how the trades of â€Å"routine traders† perform in comparison. Methodology In order to test the efficacy of this strategy, the authors construct four test portfolios at the end of month t, comprised of month it's: a) Opportunistic buys b) Opportunistic sells c) Routine buys d) Routine sells At the end of each month, the portfolios are rebalanced to reflect the routine and opportunistic inside trades and buys in that month.The objective of using these oratorios is to test whether or not there is any added value in separating routine traders from opportunistic traders, using the algorithm designed by the authors. In other words, the study tests whether following only those insiders identified by the algorithm as â€Å"opportunistic† could yield a positive alpha, and how this compares to the returns of the â€Å"routine trader† portfolios. As noted above, the SEC requires insiders to report transactions within two business days following the trade (prior to the enactment of Serbians-Solely in 2002, insiders had until the 10th day of the following month to report the trade).In the sample used by Cohen et al. , nearly all of the trades were reported on the day on which the insider made the trade. (2) As such, by the time the portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each month, information on these inside trades would have been publicly available knowledge. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the potential implications of this on the results of the strategy. Predictive Ability of Routine vs. Opportunistic Trades In order to determine whether the â€Å"opportunistic† traders, as defined by Cohen et al. s algorithm, actually contain any predictive power, the authors run pooled aggressions of returns on indicators of routine and opportunistic trades in the prior month, with future one-month returns as the dependent variable. The findings reveal that both the buy and sell opportunistic trades contained much greater predictive power than routine buys and sells. The results reveal that opportunistic buys yield average returns 0. 90 basis points (with a t-statistic of 4. 46), 76 basis points higher than that of routine buys. With a p-value of 0. %, the difference is significant. It is much better indicator than considering all insider buys. Testing opportunistic versus outing sells exhibits similar results, with a coefficient of -0. 78 in the regression of opportunistic sells, and 0. 04 in the regression of routine sells. The difference is again significant with a p-value of 0% (F=29. 30). See Table 1 in Appendix for full results. Alpha The authors test for the presence of abnormal returns using several different asset pricing models, including the CAMP and the Fame-French model, as well as others.While the tests use two different types of portfolios, one value-weighted and one equally weighted, the findings are similar and the results below will therefore focus only on the equally-weighted portfolio. In the case of opportunistic versus routine buys, the results indicate monthly CAMP alphas of 1. 51% (with a t-ratio of 5. 89 and p- value The results indicate that longing opportunistic buys, and shorting opportunistic sells could yield significant excess returns. An equally-weighted portfolio of opportunistic buys and sells yields a monthly CAMP alpha of 1. 81%, and a monthly Fame-French alpha of 1. 41%, with respective t-ratios of 5. 6 and 5. 04. Based on these results, it is evident that by separating routine and opportunistic trades from trades motivated by liquidity and diversification needs, and following only the former, outsiders may be able to significantly outperform the market. Distribution of Returns While the study by Cohen et al. Goes not provide much information on the characteristics of the distribution of returns on the various portfolios used in their study, looking at other sources which study insider trading strategies may provide some insight into this issue. This information is highly relevant to risk-averse investors, to whom the probability of losses may be as important as the expected return. In Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading, H. Negate Shun finds that the probability of loss (defined as earning lower returns than an investment in the market portfolio) on a single mimicking transaction is 49. %, excluding transaction costs, and 51 . 7% when transaction costs are taken into account. (3). When combined with the study findings o n average return, which falls in the 2-3% depending on the minor variations in the study various tests of the strategy, the approximate 50-50 arability of loss indicates a positive-skewed distribution. As such an investor must mimic a large number of insider trades in order to earn returns near the average of 2-3% in Shunt's findings. While the relatively high probability of losses may seem risk averse investors, as it indicates a smaller probability of extreme negative losses.Although there are substantial differences between Cohen et al. ‘s study and Shunt's study?likely the most important of which is that Shun does not differentiate between routine and opportunistic insiders as Cohen et al. Do?the results from Shunt's study may be an indication that the distribution of Cohen et al. ‘s results are positive-skewed as well. Indeed, it is likely that following only opportunistic traders would both reduce the probability of extreme negative losses, as well as increase the probability of extreme positive gains, thereby resulting in an even further positive- skewed distribution.In addition, the high probability of loss illustrated in Shunt's findings would likely also be reduced when following only opportunistic traders. Trading Costs and Refinancing Because this strategy involves relatively active trading, its costs (commission fees and id-ask spreads) will undoubtedly be higher than those of a buy and hold strategy. That said, when the strategy is applied selectively, as is the case in the Cohen et al. Study (I. E. By mimicking only opportunistic insiders rather than all insiders) trading costs can be significantly reduced.In Cohen et al. ‘s study, the test portfolios are rebalanced at the end of every month, based on that month's opportunistic insider trades. In both the opportunistic sell and opportunistic buy portfolios, outsiders would be able to profit by shorting and buying, respectively, holding for a month, and balancing at the end of e very month. Monthly refinancing requires immediacy, and the stocks would need to be purchased and sold using market orders. The outsider would thus incur the additional costs off larger bid-ask spread.Outsiders may potentially be able to rebalanced less frequently, submitting limit orders instead of market orders, holding on to the stocks for longer periods of time, and still profit. According to Shunt's findings,(4) in the case of an â€Å"insider buy', the profits are realized over the course of several months. (5) As such, the outsider may be able to educe refinancing to twice a year, and hold on to â€Å"insider buy' stocks for 6 months. In this case, the outsider could likely afford to submit a limit buy order and wait a few days before it executes.However, this does not apply in the case of an â€Å"insider sell†, as there is no evidence to indicate that these profits are realized over a period of many months. As such, monthly refinancing it necessary. Barriers to Imp lementation In reality, while the strategy would certainly not be difficult to follow for an institutional investor or a sophisticated individual investor, it would perhaps present mom challenges for the average investor. In Investment Intelligence from Insider Trading, Shun advises that an investor mimic close to 100 insiders, in order to reduce the probability of loss to an acceptable level. 6) Granted, applying this to a strategy which differentiates between opportunistic and routine traders would likely require an outsider to follow a smaller number of insiders in order to obtain a reasonably limited probability of loss. Another potential barrier for the average investor is differentiating between routine and opportunistic traders. While Cohen et al. Ere able to accomplish this, as would institutional and sophisticated investors, it resources to successfully differentiate between the two types of insiders.While these issues may not be particularly large obstacles, they do presen t additional considerations and challenges for the individual investor. Insider Trading and Serbians-Solely An interesting point to consider is the impact of changing SEC reporting regulations on an outsider's ability to profit from following insider trades. A Stanford University study (Zealand 2005)(6) tested the success of a generic â€Å"mimicking strategy' in the ears leading up to Serbians-Solely, versus the success of the strategy in the years following the enactment of the new legislation.The study found that in the first 27 months, it was possible to generate excess returns of up to 17. 67%, including trading costs. After this period, however, it was no longer possible to obtain these returns, likely because the market had fully adjusted to this new source of public information. Looking forward, it is possible that any further changes in SEC regulation make information more readily accessible with a smaller delay, will present investors with another opportunity to earn addi tional returns before the market is able to react.Strategy Comparison While Cohen et al. Are the first to attempt to generate excess returns by differentiating specifically between routine and opportunistic traders, a number of studies in the academic literature have sought to increase returns from following insider trading by applying the strategy in various other selective ways. Although the â€Å"routine vs.. Opportunistic† strategy appears to be the most successful thus far, several other versions of the strategy have also managed to create excess returns.A duty conducted in Sweden (Ayatollah and El-Marin, 2005) reveals that replicating insider trades of stocks listed on the A-List and Attract 40 (the Swedish stock indices reserved for larger companies with significant operating history) does not generate abnormal returns at a significant level. On the other hand, replicating buy transactions of â€Å"insider clusters† (multiple firm insiders making similar trades in the same time period) of firms trading on the O-list (designated for companies which lack the requisite operating history or size for listing on the more established lists) could generate abnormal returns up to 33. , excluding transaction costs. By selectively applying a mimicking strategy to smaller companies rather than larger ones, to buy transactions rather than sell transactions, and to insider clusters (numerous firm insiders making same-type trades in a given period of time) rather to individual investors,(7) an outsider may be able to generate excess returns. The study conducted by Shun, which examines 60,000 insider transactions on the NYSE from 1975-1981, reveals similar results. Over the course of 100 days, the buy transactions exhibited excess returns of 3%, while the sell transactions underperformed the racket by 1 . %. In other words, an outsider may have been able to profit by going long â€Å"inside buys†, but not by shorting â€Å"inside sells†. He also found that there has been a greater amount of uninformative sell transactions that have taken place in the ass, compared to the ass-ass(8), it could be that since sass, the amount and frequency of stock compensations has greatly and continuously increased,(9),thus it into routines and opportunistic you would be able to keep the informative transactions and be less affect by this tendency.Shunt's results also indicate that placating insider trades in smaller firms generated higher excess returns than insider trades in larger firms. (10) It may be easier to generate excess returns by replicating insider trades in smaller firms, because these insiders are typically subjected to less scrutiny by analysts and by the media than their counterparts in larger firms. As such, they may be more willing to engage in profitable, â€Å"performance- predicting† trades than insiders at larger firms. However, it's also possible that these trades generate higher expected returns simply bec ause they have increased risk.In order to compensate investors for this risk, investments in smaller firms can be expected to generate higher returns, as reflected in the Fame French model. Similar to the Swedish study, a study conducted by Jenny et al. (1999) (7) also found replicating insider cluster transactions to be more profitable than replicating individual insider transactions. The rationale behind this?that same-type transactions from multiple firm insiders within a given period is likely motivated by insider knowledge rather than by investor-specific needs–is fairly obvious. 11) Cohen at al. Observe similar results in Decoding Inside Information. The study findings indicate that a one- standard deviation increase in the log number of opportunistic sells translates into a decrease in future returns of 29 basis points per month (excluding the specific days each year when firm executives receive stock compensation and subsequently liquidate some of their stake in the f irm). (12) By differentiating between routine and opportunistic traders as Cohen et al. O, outsiders can avoid these routine sells, and mimic only informative inside clusters. Looking Forward Although Cohen et al. And others have illustrated various ways in which outsiders ay be able to generate excess returns by mimicking insider trades, several potential obstacles may stand in the way of this strategy in the future. As with any market inefficiency, increased popularity of the strategy as well as increased accessibility to information on insider trades may cause a decline in future returns.Today, there are already a multitude of web sites that allow outsiders to track insider trades, making information about such trades readily accessible to the average investor. As a growing number of outsiders attempt to replicate these trades, it is likely that it will come increasingly difficult for investors to mimic trades in time to capture any gains. Another potential threat to this strateg y is the proliferation of endowment assurances, which firm insiders use to take advantage of offshore solutions in order to hide their transactions. Insiders are therefore able to trade stocks and derivatives of companies â€Å"anonymously', and avoid reporting insider trades to regulators. This would obviously prohibit outsiders from gaining access to and mimicking insider trades. (13) Lastly, increased penalties for insider trading could also threaten the success of the strategy. Cohen et al. How that during periods with increased cases of investors being prosecuted for insider trading, the number of trades identified as â€Å"opportunistic† decrease. In other words, insiders take seriously the risk of being caught and charged.

bullying Essay - 794 Words

1. What is the main idea presented in Lee Tunstalls article? (2marks) The main idea in Lee Tunstalls article is how bullying impacts our society. Tunstall given information on bullying in school, cyberbullying and in the workplace. Lee Tunstall explains how important bullying is as a crime and how people are constantly affected by bullying. 2. Overall, is Lee Tunstalls article biased? If you think it is, describe how you know they are biased. If you think it isnt, describe how Tunstall avoids bias. (3 marks) I believe Lee Tunstalls article is not bias and she aviods being bias by stating facts. Lee Tunstall uses many references to create her article, but states common points throughout the article. Such as, the high-profile case of†¦show more content†¦c) Homophobic Bullying- bullying based on the sexual orientation or gender identiy of that person. d) Workplace bullying- bullying that happens at your place of work, usually by peers, supervisors or even your boss. e) Zero-tolerance: is a policy that authority figures in schools have no tolerance for any acts of bullying. 5. Why do you think Tunstall wrote this article? (2 marks) I believe Tunstall wrote this article on bullying because the author felt very passionatly about how bullying can affect ones life. I also believe Tunstall wrote this article because she had once been bullied before. I feel like everyne has been bullied once in their lives. It can go from a small comment bullying to extreme bullying where there person is targeted everyday. When reading the article I had a sense that Tunstall wanted to raise awareness on how serious this issue is and how we need to make a change. 6. Paraphrase the two paragraghs that describe the two high-profile bullying cases of Reena Virk and Dawn-Marie Wesley. Remember that when you paraphrase, you must change both the word choices and the sentence structure. Because you are paraphrasing entire paragraghs here, you should be rearranging and recombining sentences as well. Also keep in mind that paraphrases need to maintain the same level of detail as the original passage, so make sure your paraphrase is detailed,Show MoreRelatedBullying And Bullying : Bullying1180 Words   |  5 Pages Bullying is defined as unwanted or aggressive behavior that causes someone to feel afraid or intimidated. This behavior could be something physical, verbal, or something done electronically or through social media. If someone feels threatened by someone’s actions or words, it could be considered bullying, even if that was not the intent.There are many types of bullying, how to recognize bullying, how to report bullying, what to do if you see incidents of bullying, and what resources are availableRead MoreBullying : Bullying And Bullying985 Words   |  4 PagesBullying You may hear the word bullying a lot but never actually knew what it meant, well know is the time to know and be aware of what’s happening around you. Bullying is the use of force, threat, or aggressively dominate others. Bullying is common worldwide but there are specific types that are more common than others, there are four types of common bullying one of them is verbal bullying meaning when someone calls another person name, treating, and making disrespectful comments about someone isRead MoreBullying : Bullying And Bullying1366 Words   |  6 PagesKyle McBrady Ms. Coyle English 2A (3) 9 December 2014 Bullying Leading to Violence Bullying is when a person abuses his power to another person by causing physical or mental harm to the victim who is often weaker, says Dictionary.com (Bullying). This definition can be applied to a recent story in The Washington Post, where bullying caused a student by the name of Jaylen Fryberg to shoot his friends in a lunchroom cafeteria. Jaylen and his girlfriend had recently broken up and she began cyberbullyingRead MoreBullying : Bullying And Bullying1000 Words   |  4 Pages Bullying was defined as overly powered strength used when intimidating one, demanding ones request. Cyberbullying was defined as using electronic devices such as computers, texting, cellphones, iPad’s, etc. Bullying and Cyberbullying are similar in so many ways. One major similarity is aggressiveness, which is used to cause harm to a victim. They both are done to cause the victim pain. Cyberbullying and Bullying are neither often reported. Bullying is repeated behavior over and over again. ThoseRead MoreBullying : Bullying And Bullying880 Words   |  4 Pages Ever since this incident administrators have taken serious actions and the bullying has dramatically decreased. Students ceased to create rumors about him. They don’t physically abuse him or call him names in front of his peers anymore. However, he still gets talked about behind his back but of course it’s not as bad as before. He visits his counselor on a weekly basis and things have gotten much better. I’m glad that I stuck around to be there for him while he struggled with such a horrible timeRead MoreBullying : Bullying And Bullying1387 Words   |  6 PagesAn average bullying session lasts about 37 seconds; an adult intervenes in the problem about one in twenty-five times (Bullying Facts). Bullying is seen as aggressive and unwanted behavior between two or more people (Aspa).   Most people who are not involved in the actions going on do not really know it’s happening.   Most parents do not even know when their child, or children, are being bullied (Bullying Facts).   Bullying can be prevented if the right consequences take place.   Parents and schoolsRead MoreBullying : Bullying And Bullying769 Words   |  4 Pagesphysically bullied on the premise and cyber-bullying. The females reported more Cyber-bullying, off-school premises, through text massages and social media outlets. The males reported a higher rate of physical bullying on the school premise than the females. Students reported the occurrence of physical intimidation preventing younger students to access hallways. Also, student’s who are perceived as â€Å"different† are target and taunted. Currently, the bullying behavior seems to be accepted by the staffRead MoreBullying : Bullying And Bullying948 Words   |  4 Pages Bullying Teasing and playing around are all part of growing up; however, what happens when it happens over and over. The Hernando County Code of Conduct defines bullying as: systematically and chronically inflicting physical hurt or psychological distress, or physical behavior, including and threatening, insulting, or dehumanizing gesture, by a student or adult, that is severe or pervasive enough to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational environment; cause discomfort orRead MoreBullying : Bullying And Bullying941 Words   |  4 PagesThere are different ways to describe bullying. Stopbullying.gov states the definition of bullying is â€Å"unwanted, aggressive behavior among school aged children that involves a real or perceived power imbalance.† Webster’s dictionary portrays the definition of bullying is to frighten, hurt, or threaten (a smaller or weaker person): to act like a bully toward (someone), or to cause (someone) to do something by making th reats or insults or by using force. Violenceproventionworks.org mentions A personRead MoreBullying : Bullying And Bullying1030 Words   |  5 PagesKassandra Barragan Ms. Filar English 4/ Per: 1 9 May 2017 Bullying While doing research on bullying, I found studies on subject like cyber bullying, physical bullying, and verbal bullying. Bullying is a big problem now and has been in our society for some time. What is disturbing is that school is supposed to be a place where students learn and try to get away from outside problems but sadly some see it as a battlefield or place of survival. According to Webster s Dictionary, a bully is someone